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ABSTRACT
Banyak konflik terjadi  atas nama kebenaran dan 
kebebasan. Dan konflik menjadi lebih serius seringkali 
karena dikaitkan dengan kebenaran ilahi. Artikel ini 
hendak menunjukkan bahwa bukanlah kerinduan atas 
kebebasan, bukan pula keyakinan terhadap Tuhan, 
melainkan ilusi memiliki kebenaran, penyamaan 
sewenang-wenang kebebasan dan kebenaran, serta 
pemisahan antara kebenaran dari kehidupanlah penyebab 
utama konflik. Berdasarkan inspirasi Heidegger, artikel ini 
melihat kebenaran dan kebebasan dalam kaitan dengan 
kehidupan. Benar berarti setia dan beriman kepada 
kehidupan yang dinamis. Bebas berarti bebas dari daya-
daya yang menghancurkan kehidupan, demi lebih 
membela tujuan-tujuan hidup yang lebih mendalam.
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he “Third World” and socialist countries have been more often Tthan not accused by the West of  being the abusers of  human 
rights. One of  their “crimes” is, perhaps the most controversial: offense 
against religious freedom.  As expected, such condemnation is completely 
rejected by them, and even by a great deal of  Western thinkers. However, 
such complaint falls into deaf  ears. Worse, it is ignored, paradoxically, even 
by the accuser as well as by the accused. In fact, there is almost no difference 
among the powerful rulers, be they in the “first” or in the “third” world. 
They are those who set standard for “truth” and “justice,” and who claim 
the rights for themselves, at least in their own countries. To the ruling class, 
freedom serves rather as a pretext, but not as their true concern. The remark 
of  Mr. Jiang Dze-ming, the former President of  China, echoed by the rulers 
of  many countries, that China has different conception of  human rights, 
and that freedom is fully respected here, actually follows the same logic of  
power (the reverse side of  Bacon's logic of  knowledge): who has power, has 
the rights to decide! The ruled have no other choice but to dutifully obey the 
ruler's criteria of  human rights imposed on the them against their will, 
simply because power is not in their hands.
 The rulers know so well that knowledge and power are twin brothers, 
and that justice and human rights are at their wimp. Sadly enough, truth and 
rights do not stand at the side of  the weak. Justice for the poor and the 
oppressed is only a beautiful slogan (or an opium in Marx's remark of  
religion) consoling them. Blaise Pascal's sarcastic remark that “justice is for 
everyone, the rich gets richer and the poor gets  poorer” may sound too 
pessimistic, but true to some extent. This “naked truth” about power is 
equally applied to all men, regardless of  races and geographical origin. So, 
the answer is quite simple: if  power determines truth, then it is the business 
of  acquiring power which is more essential. Truth serves rather as a means 
and not the end.
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Power, Truth and Freedom
 Bacon's attempt to elevate knowledge (truth) to the same rank of  
power has been distorted. The disgracing knowledge is taken, not as noble 
ideal but as tool against humanity. Similarly, the Enlightenment's spirit has 
been deformed: neither the force of  judgment (Kant) nor the idea of  
freedom but power (the power of  the people in the case of  the French 
revolution) that makes history. This means the rulers have successfully 
transformed “the force of  knowledge” into the most effective weapon to 
dismiss the rights of  the ruled, to suppress freedom of  other people and to 
impose the “Western” criteria of  truth and “moral” standards on the latter. 
Gun-boat policy, artillery power, modern equipped army (results of  the 
knowledge-as-power belief) as well as (Western) truth and morals are now 
taken to consolidate and expand the power of  the ruling class.
 Rousseau, surely, is neither the first nor the last thinker unmasking the 
hypocrisy of  the rulers. Socrates might have had the right to claim the 
thinkers per excellence for himself  with his critique of  the Sophists and his 
total devotion to truth. One may say with some confidence that both 
Socrates and Rousseau (and not Galileo or Descartes) have set a good 
example for intellectuals with their relentless critique and non-
compromising attitude. As we see, true philosophers, social activists, and 
foremost, theologians have often raised their critical voice against the 
rampant abuse of  human rights of  the rulers. They mistrust the truth 
proclaimed by the rulers. They challenge knowledge (ideology) that claims 
to be the final. In their view, those who pretend to possess absolute truth 
(total knowledge) are the worst offenders of  human rights and freedom. 
Racism, imperialism capitalism, colonialism, to name just the most recent 
ideologies and practices, are solidified by the belief  in a certain truth: truth 
about the superiority of  a certain race ( Arian race in the case of  Nazism, 
Han race in the case of  the feudal China), of  certain nation (British empire, 
the France of   Napoleon), of  a certain class (aristocracy in the past and the 
high class today). So in the eyes  of   Western  intellectuals, the  claimed 
truth  is nothing but a fabricated idea, used as a justification for the atrocities 
the rulers commit.
 From this consideration, the West condemnation of  the “Third 
World” and the angry objection of  the latter display  rather a bitter fight  to 
power, and not for truth, justice and freedom. That is not the kind of  battle 
between  Cain and Abel, and much less between the bad and the good. That 
is a war of  the ones fouled by uncontrolled lust for power. So, the accusers 
look as embarrassed as the accused. The self-pretended prosecutor turns to 
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be the most outrageous violator. Are they blatant liars? Or are they of  good 
will  and sincerity? No doubt, they are just belonging to the same class with 
the same insatiable ambition. And they both claim truth for themselves.
 In such aspect, one could understand similar controversies in our 
present world. The burning and dreadful conflict in the Middle East, just as 
the tension between the North and the South, cannot be understood 
without a thorough investigation of  the relation of  power and truth. Truth 
is claimed not because of  truth in se, but because of  the conviction of  the 
role  of  truth  in acquiring, consolidating and preserving power. Absolute 
truth warrants a lasting power. From such dogma, we are sticking to our 
belief, regarding it as a “sacred mission” defending our religion  or ideology. 
Freedom is therefore understood  as the right to believe in our own truth, 
and  to liberate us from “un-truth”. Freedom even means the “duty” to 
freely  convince others of  our truth (missionary works). In a loose 
description, freedom expresses our “free” will to take whatever measure to 
achieve our goal, including violence and dictatorship. In this context, we can  
understand  the reason  of  why in the name of  freedom “the fighters of  
freedom” have resorted to the anti-freedom and anti-human rights means.  
Suppression, murder, terror, slavery, intimidation, etc., are “justified “ by 
“belief ” and “ truth”. Freedom , therefore, means emancipation from the 
yoke of  others, but not from our own yoke. We understand now the 
paradox of  freedom and truth: freedom contains in itself  the element of  
un-freedom and “our” truth contains in itself  the anti-truth element.
 This paradox is vividly in human acts. On the pretext of  defending 
freedom (of  expression), a great deal of  Western media have severely 
wounded religious feeling and belief  (not only  of  he Islamic world). One 
the name of  the truth, the rulers forcefully condemn intellectuals to silence. 
They deny and even testify against truth. So, it is not the question of  
whether the kind of  freedom of  expression (a human right) is compatible 
(or incompatible) to religious life (also a human right), but the question of  
truth-claim and freedom-claim, which must be carefully dealt with.
 I am trying to approach  the problem form an indirect (or oblique) 
perspective. I will not follow the traditional approach by beginning  with a 
definition of  truth or freedom but with  a critique of  human illusion of  
being the inheritor of  God's truth  and God's nature (freedom). I will  argue 
that, it is neither our yearning for freedom nor our belief  in God but rather, 
our illusion of  truth-passion, and  our arbitrary identification of  truth  with 
freedom as well as our artificial separation of  truth and freedom from  life, 
are the causes of  conflict. This means truth and freedom in se are not the 
cause of  conflict. Conflict is rooted in our lust for power, and expressed in 
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our claim of  truth-inheritor and freedom-possession. 
 To prove the tenability of  this view, I will examine the process of  
twisting from truth in life to truth as life. Such radical twist has been made 
possible thanks to philosophers like Plato and Neo-Platonians. They 
conceived of  freedom in terms of  truth. As free men, they  are firmly  convinced 
of  their “own” truth. The claim of  truth-possession, as  identified with  
religion, yields the same result. The original understanding of  freedom as a 
part of  human nature that makes man as man has been distorted into a pure 
theory of  freedom (in philosophy) as an unconditioned free state. That  means 
freedom as the  emancipation from the state of  slavery. And they regarded 
the true man as a free man. A slave is not a man, and slavery means un-
freedom. Such a concept of  freedom does not deny, intrinsically, the 
concepts of  finitude and  dependency. Man is limited by death, and by his 
dependency on others. But he feels nonetheless free  because he is a true 
human being, and a true human being is always aware of  his finitude and his 
dependency. Therefore the idea of  God's providence does not include  the 
feeling of  un-freedom. The believer in God never feels and regards himself  
as a slave, but rather, as God's son. He enjoys the freedom even if  he is 
aware of  his limit. 
 From such consideration, I would conclude with a reflection on the 
notion of  “the clash of  civilizations” (to use Samuel Huntington's 
language). In my own view, the clash among different peoples is not rooted 
in the difference of  cultures (civilizations), but rather in the belief  of  the 
superiority of  a certain culture, i.e. in a strong belief  in a certain system of  
values as the truest and highest ones, and especially in our illusion of  being 
the sole possessor of  such truth and such freedom. So any solution to such 
kind of  conflict could be possible only if  human beings are willing to free 
themselves from the utopia of  being the sole possessor of  the “kingdom of  
truth” (to use Kant's language).
The Twist From Truth In Life To Truth As Life
 The main reason of  conflict among religious worlds, and even among 
scientist communities is most probably rooted in our illusion of  being the 
sole possessor of  truth. That happened to the Medieval Christian Church, 
the Enlightenment protagonists, and the religious fundamentalists today. 
Conflict becomes deadly when our desire transcends our own finitude, 
when  we entertain the illusion of  being our own creator. The 
“philosopher-king” of  Plato, the “philosopher “ of  Hegel, the 
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“Superhuman” of  Nietzsche and “proletariat” of  Marx, all stirred more 
troubles than solution simply because of  their claim of  being the possessor 
of  the “final truth.” To be sure, such an illusion is constructed on and 
cemented by the formal logic of  truth with its corollaries: the principle of  
identity and the principle of  non-contradiction: the true must be the same, 
and consequently, truth is universal and necessary. The mathematical 
formula of  truth 1=1 has been taken as the most obvious and irrefutable 
form to pass judgment on all sciences, including human sciences. Descartes 
and German rationalists have expanded and applied this mathematical 
formula to the whole  of  human sciences (moral science, in the case of  
Kant). It goes more radically with a bizarre principle of  either-or (that Søren 
Kierkegaard has attacked in his Either-Or) and its logical law of  “the 
excluded third” (excluded middle). So , the conclusion of  one true God is 
drawn from the premise of  one truth. If  our God is true, then your gods 
must be false; if  our ideology is true, then all other ideologies must be false.
 It is not a mistake to take truth as the objective of  sciences, but it would 
be questionable to believe it as the αрχη paragraf  τελος , the alpha and the 
omega, i.e. the total sum of  human life. Let us begin first with the claim of  
truth as the unique objective of  life, and the sole means determining our 
thinking and actions. To many of  us, the idea of  a philosophy was palpable 
in Homeric tradition: a tradition centered on life. The twist begun with 
Thales, who in his search for the origin of  life has identified the 
characteristic of  life itself: the most original life must be the truest one (i.e. 
the most universal and necessary). Truth and life seems a to be the same. 
Other Greek philosopher followed suit and went much more radically. The 
Phytagorians abstracted human life and identified numbers as the origin of  
the universe. They may be quite correctly regarded as the predecessors of  
Galileo. The latter described the universe in terms of  mathematical 
structure. In a word, one may say, Pre-Socratic philosophy is, in a certain 
sense, a constant search for truth, by means of  arguments based on truth  
itself. Truth, and not life, is now the objective of  our quest. 
 It was Socrates who gave a final and decisive stamp on truth as the 
unique objective of  philosopher. By insisting on truth implicit in life, 
Socrates embraced the view that truth is the most valuable treasure. Indeed, 
true to his view, he had sacrificed his own  life for truth. Truth is also the 
objective of  the business of  scientific research. It is the essence of  science 
indeed. And it is the most secure means to safeguard truth and life.
 However, what is truth? This question, the most  important one, has 
not been satisfactorily answered so far.  When Socrates chided the Sophists 
for mistaking truth with opinion, and especially  for having claimed truth 
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for themselves, he had clearly opted for the view that truth can be acquired 
only  by means of  a constant search and critique (in the form of  dialogue). 
Now the problem  is, if  truth can be acquired  by a permanent investigation, 
then the acquired truth is temporal. The newly acquired truth would replace 
the one previously believed. To say with Hegel, temporal truth appears real, 
but that is the reality of  a certain people in a certain age, i.e. an incomplete, 
partial truth. However, Hegel still believes in an eternal truth which he 
identified with reason. In his view, the true kernel determining the Zeitgeist 
and the Volksgeist must be the rational. But the kernel (the rational) is either 
unknowable (as a noumenon in Kant) or incompletely  known because the 
rational emerges in a constant and infinite process (Hegel). So, truth known 
by us  cannot be grasped in toto. We know only  a part of  it. Karl Popper 
radically  developed this view to the edge of  rationalism and to the brink of  
a possible collapse of  Platonian truth: no truth is final. Any claim of  having 
a final truth  would  contradict the essence of  truth. In this Socrates' way of  
philosophizing, what we may  grasp is not truth but reality, i.e. temporal and 
spatial aspect of  truth. We know for sure a certain facie of  truth but not truth 
in its totality.
 The question of  “what is truth?” is still unanswered. It is left open by 
Socrates and his followers. His closest disciple, the ambitious Plato, had 
attempted to fulfill the mission of  his master by having claimed to produce a 
final, irrefutable answer. He proved that truth is the most universal and 
necessary. It is the substance of  all substances. In a word, it is divine and 
contemplative. Despite the warm reception of  the Neo-Platonians (like 
Plotinus, Filone and Clemente) who found in God the absolute Truth, such  
an answer, regretfully, leaves behind more irresolvable puzzle. Nietzsche is 
neither the first  nor the last who rebelled against such view with his satirical 
declaration of  the death of  God. The non-existence of  God is interpreted 
as the non-existence of  truth, just as His death means the end of  Plato's 
truth. Without an absolute truth, Nietzsche plunged into a certain form of  
negativity  of  such thinking. Nihilism's question of  “what is truth?” has not 
been answered. It is simply  dismissed as non-sense: “Was sind diese 
Kirchen noch, wenn sie nicht die Gruefte und Grabmaeler Gottes sind?”.
 The twist from truth in life to as life  has been unmasked by Heidegger. 
He is, surely, not the first but the most eloquent opponent of  Plato's truth 
and even of  Nietzsche's negative nihilism. Traditional truth in terms of  
representation, or of  correspondence (adequatio intellectus et rei of  Thomas 
Aquinas), or of  agreement, or of  identification (positivism), or of  
coherence and pragmatic could not reveal the true essence of  truth, because 
it is detached from the Upspring of  truth, i.e. life. Traditional criteria of  truth 
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have been based on the fact, or phenomena, or the similarity but not on 
their source and their dynamic force. 
 So, if  truth is not life but only an essential aspect (authenticity), then it 
is not the question of  “what is truth” but “ what is life” must be the 
objective  of  philosophy.  In Heidegger's harsh critique, philosophers from 
Plato to Nietzsche have scratched where does not itch. Ontology must be 
anthropology, and therefore, truth cannot be separated from human life. 
The investigation of  life and its basic characteristics yield a new light on 
human beings in terms of  freedom, on freedom and on  truth itself. Kant's 
insistence on autonomy as the essence of  moral identity, i.e. on freedom, 
does not contradict his faith in truth as the foundation of  morals. Only in 
the context of  life that truth can be grasped in freedom, and freedom can 
manifest itself  in truth. In Heidegger's interpretation of  truth as αληθεια 
truth no longer plays the role of  God or the a-temporal and non-spatial 
mathematical formula, but reveals itself  freely in the world. Erschlossenheit, 
Entdeckheit, Unverborgenheit, etc. (uncovering, self-revelation) are the 
essential characteristics marking the nature of  truth. In this sense, he 
regards the essence of  truth as freedom.
  Heidegger's radical interpretation of  truth in the sense of  self-
revelation is, of  course, not new. However, it is interesting to note that even 
if  Heidegger has tried very hard to dismiss the role of  God as custodies, 
providential or the philosopher (Hegel) in favor of  God as artist ingenious (like 
Nietzsche); he still follows the same logic of  religion: only the God-like 
being can reveal itself. In addition, the God-like being possesses the power of  
self-existence, and the power of  self-determination, i.e. the power of  a creator. In a 
sense, Heidegger regards freedom as the essence of  truth. Like the 
Epiphany that expresses the self-revelation of  God's true nature, freedom 
displays the essence (i.e. the condition and nature) of  human existence. If  
Epiphany is a process of  God in the World then, analogically, Being is in a 
constant process of  self-emergence. So Being's epiphany expresses not 
only its autonomy but, much more, its freedom: to be the self  and at the 
same the other (the different). It is in this sense that Heidegger may have 
right to claim that the essence of  truth is freedom; and also in this sense that 
the postmodernist have understood science in particular and human beings 
in general.
Freedom And Truth In Religion
 Only in this context I would argue that Heidegger's interpretation of  
truth does not stem directly from Nietzsche's thought ( as some 
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postmodernist may insist), but rooted in religious source. Earlier religious 
thinkers, actually, never separated truth and freedom from life. Truth in 
religion is not a formula, or a criterion, or a means but the most authentic 
aspect of  life, just as freedom is not what is given to us but an essential part 
of  human life which makes human God-likeable. There is no formula of  
truth in religion. There is no unique way leading to God. And, of  course, 
there is no image that can depict precisely and truthfully the Godhead. Here 
is the reason why God forbids idolatry. In this sense, Heidegger's 
interpretation of  Being's authenticity does not follow the pattern of  
traditional criteria of  “certainty” and “clarity” ( of  Descartes). Authenticity, 
actually, refers to what essentially constitutes life. As such, it gives light to 
what Christ means by truth. Truth cannot be separated from the Way and 
from our life: Christus via, veritas et vita est.(John 14:6).
Truth and life
 One clearly finds here the closest, almost inseparable, relationship 
between truth and life., truth and the way to life. And this idea has been the 
most important concepts in almost all religions, and not in Christianity 
alone. It determines the behaviors, thought and even aspiration of  
believers. There is no internal contradiction here between freedom and 
truth, truth and life. In this perspective, North Alfred Whitehead rightly 
wrote:
 “A religion., on its doctrinal side, can thus be defined as a system of  
general truths which have the effect of  transforming the character 
when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended.”
 Of  course, the “system of  general truths” here does not mean the 
system of  truth built on purely mathematical form. Truth can be known 
only if  it is “sincerely held and vividly apprehended.” Needless to say, this 
kind of  understanding of  truth is originated in many religious traditions, 
the Eastern as well as the Western. Let us take a look in the history of  
Christianity to see how such a truth is conceived.
 According to the study of  Waldemar Molinski, truth originally ( in the 
Hebrew emeth) means in the first place “to be firm, reliable, faithful or 
fidelity” (2 Sam 7:28; Ps 119:160), “sincerity and constancy” (Ps 132:11), 
“loyalty of  the people to God” (Jos 24: 14; 1 Kg 20:3; Is 38:3; Ps 26:3; 86:11). 
The meaning of  truth as the correspondence between assertion and reality ( 
3 Kg 10:6; 22:16) or the identification of  “law as truth” ( Job 4:6; 13:6; 
161
   Tran Van Doan : The Claim Of  Truth And The Claim Of  Freedom 
Ecclus 27:9) comes only second. Similarly, truth in the New Testament means 
firstly as “fidelity and reliability of  God” ( Rom 3:1-7), “human sincerity” 
(2 Cor7: 14; Phil 1:18;3:8;4:4; 1Tim 2:7;2 Jn 1), or “the quality of  the genuine 
and obligatory which attached to the gospel” (Eph 4:21; Gal 2:5,14; ROM 
2:8; 2Cor4:2; Gal 5:7). Truth is taken to be “the word of  God” (2 Cor4;2; 
Gal5:7), and “authoritative doctrines(1Tim6:5; 2 Tim18; 3:18;4:4) comes 
second. The interpretation of  divine law as love. So, in John's Gospel, truth 
is understood as the most necessary act of  love, “the reality of  salvation 
which sets me free” (John 8:32).
 Such understanding of  truth has been the basic teaching in the earlier 
Christianity, until St. Augustine who, under the heavy shadow of  Neo-
Platonism, explained truth in terms of  reality. He combines the Johannine 
Logos with the Plotinian Nous (Confessons, VII, 9). In other words he linked 
truth as life to the divine (contemplative) truth. In DeTrinitate, (VII, 3), he 
stated that the (God) Son is the truth since He is the Word who reveals the 
(God) Father. As Such, Augustine understood truth as eternal reality. In De 
Libero Arbitrio, he clearly conceived of  truth as absolute, eternal and 
changeless (II, 15,39). Drawn from such premise, he argued that the truth is 
not created but discovered by us only (De Vera Religione, 39,72). Truth is the 
ultimate objective of  our life, and our search for truth determines the 
movement of  thought.
 From St. Augustine on, Christian philosophers (Boethius, St. Anselm 
Canterbury, and especially St. Thomas) have interpreted truth  as the “ 
primordial opening out of  being”(ens et verum convertuntur), and at the same 
time as  the function of  judgment ( Adequatio intellectus et rei). St. Thomas 
identified God as the first Truth and the foundation of  all truth, while Duns 
Scotus, by distinguishing  the ontological from the logical truth, gave to 
God the source of  ontological truth. To prove God's existence, one has to 
rely on logical truth, however.
 Now, we discover a slow change from the concept of  truth as life 
(ontological truth) to that of  the source of  life (God), and finally to that of  
the so-called logical truth. Modern philosophers like Descartes went farther 
than most of  his predecessors. He conceived God as the warrant for logical  
truth (Meditationes, III). He argued that man cannot be the origin of  his 
infinite ideas ( Discours de  la methode, 2, 14 ), i.e. truth. So, it is God who is the 
source and the warrant of  truth. However, he insisted on the clara et distincta 
idea as the essential characteristic of  truth which exists only in pure thinking 
(Meditationes,  III,4). Such a truth loses its traces in life and  squanders in “the 
word of  purely thinking.” Descartes' radical interpretation of  truth in term 
of  logical truth gives way to modern way of  understanding  truth as purely 
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logical, and consequently, truth is detached from life.
Freedom and Life
 Similar twist is found in human understanding of  freedom. The 
original meaning of  freedom in religious tradition as true image of  God 
(imago Dei) has been often interpreted as restricted freedom: the freedom 
of  the created. Such interpretation inclines to the view that only the total, 
unrestricted freedom of  Creator can be called true freedom. Freedom here 
is understood as the free act towards any possible purpose. But, this kind of  
understanding of  freedom, actually, has surpassed the original meaning of  
freedom: freedom towards a fixed purpose ( imago Dei), i.e. to the truest 
human.
 Now, the question is, if  human freedom cannot overstep the limit 
(human nature) and surpass it own purpose ( to become perfect like  God , 
then the so-called positive freedom (freedom to) and the negative freedom 
(freedom from ) must be understood in the context human nature and 
human activities, that means in the context of  human life freedom 
expresses human attempt to overcome the conditions that restraint, 
diminish or dismiss the fulfillment of  human life, and at the same time, 
freedom displays human force in fulfilling life. So the question here must be  
double : which conditions do we need to overcome ? and what kind of  life 
can fulfill human nature? The answer to these questions is essential to our 
understanding of  freedom.
 Different answers to the first part of  question of  which conditions do 
we have to overcome constitute  the notion of  negative freedom. Answer 
given by different religious, philosophers and politicians displays the 
different approaches to the problem. To Christianity, it is the sin that limits 
human capacity of  self-fulfillment. To Buddhism, they are the main causes ( 
craving for wealth, pleasure power, continued existence) of  unhappiness. 
To the Marxist, it is unjust social structure. It is clear that freedom in terms 
of  emancipation or liberation is implicit in these answers: liberation from 
slavery, escape from the yoke of  samsara, and emancipation from class 
society. That is what we often identify as the negative  freedom, the libertas 
ad coactione.
 Such kind of  freedom does not, however, solve the inner 
contradictions of  freedom: freedom can be known and gained at the cost of  
others' un-freedom. There is hardly a demarcation between individual 
freedom and individual interest. If  freedom means freely pursue one's own 
interests, then conflict is a logical result of  freedom. And to solve conflicts 
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requires the restriction of  other's freedom. The others here are the 
powerless people. So the belief  that freedom is the most desired, or the 
ultimate objective of  human beings, would not make sense, or would make 
a little sense, to the majority of  people. The belief  in freedom as “freeing 
from” would turn to be an illusion as long as  power is still on the hands of  a 
few rulers. Aware of  this sad fact, John Stuart Mill proposes an 
understanding of  freedom from its positive aspect. He wrote: “The only 
freedom which deserves the name is that of  pursuing our own good in our 
own way.” He concedes the fact that such freedom is possible only if  we can 
become our own master. To be our own master means a self-realization. 
But, Mill does not discuss the question of  how to be aware of  being master 
and how to become master, i.e. how to realize one self. Kant and German 
ideologists refer to the idea of  autonomy and consciousness of  the self, 
while Marx to the force (labor) as the conditio sine qua non that makes  man 
autonomous. In other words, to be the master demands, firstly, self-
consciousness and, secondly, the force of  self-subsisting and self-
developing. This is impossible due to human relation and reliance on others 
and on nature. A self-consciousness cannot be found  in the ego alone, just 
as a man like Robinson  could never exist  in our present society. So, the 
insistence on the equality of  liberty to all human beings seems to be rather a 
wish, or pure idea in the brain of  (German) ideologists. Aristotle was not 
completely wrong when he discovered the existence of  the rulling class 
thanks to slavery. He was wrong because he did not foresee human 
evolution thanks to human labor. The master knows how to use effectively 
his own force and the labor of  his slave to realize his good life, while the 
slave just works for his master and not for himself. Despite his 
unwillingness to treat the problem from point of  view of  German 
philosophers, Mill still regards the positive freedom in terms of  human self-
realization.
 To my purpose, I will not delve into Mill's controversy but start with 
his insight of  freedom as a means for and an expression of  self-realization. 
So, the center of  our discussion would be whether self-realization could 
fulfill human quest for ultimate happiness, i.e. whether the positive freedom 
could be human most desired ends, and whether such an objective is also 
that of  religion.
 The fact that freedom can be understood and appreciated in a certain 
life, and that human life can be fulfilled thanks to other elements (and 
factors) relating to life points to the truth that it is life and not freedom or 
truth the final end of  human beings. So, one may  argue that freedom makes 
sense only if  fulfils life, makes it perfect. If  so, then final question for us 
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should be:  which kind of  life can be appreciated as perfect life. Negative 
freedom expresses human aspiration for not being restrained by the 
conditions which may jeopardize, limit and destroy life. Positive freedom 
points to human desire to achieve what we consider as the fulfillment, the 
perfection of  life. In religion, the freedom to fulfill and to perfect life can be 
termed as transcendental freedom (libertas transcendentalis). The desire of  
transcending the status quo and ascending towards the highest stage, i.e. 
“being over and beyond” present life is, without doubt, the kernel of  any 
serious religion. It is religious spirit that motivates human beings to seek for 
perfect life. Such transcendental freedom is seen in human active 
participation ( or engagement) into the absolute world of  God. Thomas 
Aquinas describes such act of  transcendental freedom in order that 
negative freedom and positive freedom  be understood.
Concluding Remark
 My objection to the claim of  freedom-possession is based on my 
rejection of  the claim of  truth-possession. Against such claims, I took 
Heidegger's insight of  truth as  self-revelation, i.e. a free state of  self-
presentation to show that human pretension to being able to grasp truth in its 
totality is  the product of  pure imagination. The uncontrolled lust for power, 
advocated by Nietzsche, seductively pulls human into the hallucination of  
being God or semi-God. So,  truth-possession and Freedom-possession, 
the property of  the Creator, have been falsely claimed by these “supermen.” 
This absurdity has been the hallmark of  many “imperialist” ideologies and 
cultures. I think, the source of  the “clash of  civilizations” (to use 
Huntington's language) is not the difference of  races and cultures but our 
actual claim of  truth and freedom for us only.
     To reflect on truth and freedom must, therefore, begin with deeper 
reflection on life. Descartes' mathematical truth does not contradict the 
logic of  life if  he did not separate life from the truth. Kant's plead for a 
freedom in the sense of  autonomy does not contradict human 
transcendental nature, if  he conducted more investigation into the limit of  
reason. However, there is still a difference between Descartes and Kant. If  
Descartes remained content with his discovered truth which he did not 
bother to expand to life in toto, then for Kant, it is the question of  “Was ist 
der Mensch?” the center of  his investigation (Kant, Kritik der Reinen 
Vernunft, A 804f; B 832f.). Man cannot be understood in a single, static 
aspect. It can be apprehended only in a dynamic and infinite process of  self-
realization.
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   At the beginning of  the 20 century, Whitehead's insight of  the correlation 
between mathematical truth and religious truth is striking. One can be a 
good mathematician and a religious man,  because there exists no internal 
contradiction between truth and life. So is the relation between truth and 
freedom. Both are rooted in life. Wittgenstein's pondering about the origin 
mathematics, just as Heidegger's relentless quest for the truth and freedom 
lead them to a similar conclusive view: mathematics is inseparable from life, 
just as truth and freedom are only the most expressive forms of  authentic 
life. Edmund Husserl's strong objection to the so-called “mathematization 
of  the world” (in his Die krisis der eupropaeischen Wissenschaft…) has forced the 
rationalists to ponder again the legitimacy of  the “mighty reason.” Actually, 
in Husserl's view, truth would lose its sense if  it is separated from life. Truth 
would reduce the meaning of  our flourishing life if  it is determined by 
rational criteria which are fully neutral from life.
      So, it is time to rethink truth and freedom in terms of  life, and not the 
reverse. To be truthful means also to be loyal to life; and to be loyal means to 
be faithful (as seen in religious belief). Our faith cannot be demonstrated by 
a set of  criteria built on formal truth, but by our “truest” feelings, by our 
deepest sense to life. Similarly, to be free does not mean to be completely in a 
free state, but free only from the untrue forces which deform or destroy life. 
In this sense, Marx's concept of  liberty in the sense of  liberation from the 
(social, economic, political) conditions making human alienated (or reified) 
does not, actually, play against religious understanding of  freedom: freedom 
means a liberation from the state of  slavery, and a condition to restore 
humanity as well as to fulfill it. It is in religion that one finds freedom in its 
full sense: a liberation from the negative forces that restrict or hinder human 
transcendence, and a positive engagement striving forwards to the ultimate 
purposes.
End Notes:
1. In the case of  socialist countries, the Western human rights watchers 
have cited the lack of  a certain freedom of  religion as the main offense 
of  human rights.
2. Note that the most ardent criticicts of  the Western culture (and 
religion) are theologians. Among the pupils of  Friedrich W. Schelling's 
class on religion, one finds the name of  Bakunin, Kierkegaard, Engels. 
Marx adhered himself  to the “Doktorklub,” the majority of  which are 
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theologians (Bauer, Stirner, Feuerbach and other). Today, the so-called 
theologians of  liberation still stay at the front battling against 
imperialist suppression and capitalist exploitation.
3. Such paradox has been brilliantly analyzed by Horkheimer and 
Adorno. See Marx Horkheimer & Theodor W. Adorno, The Dialectic of  
Enlightenment. Trans. John Cumming. (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1972).
4. The furor of  Islamists against Salman Rushdies' The Satanic Verse, and 
most recent outrage against  a Danish cartoonist is a case in point. No 
doubt, both Islamic believers and the cartoonist were certain of  their 
own truth  and both  call up to human rights (freedom) to justify their 
violent acts and their  abused languages defending  their truth. In the 
case of  Dan Brown's Leonardo da Vinci's Codes, it is    the question of  
whether one can abuse the freedom of  expression to distort religious 
truth?
5. To say with Thomas Kuhn, the author of   The Structure of  Scientific 
Discovery (1962).
6. Martin Heidegger, Sein unz Zeit, 44; Especially in Platons Lehre von der 
Wahrheit  and Wahreit Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.
7. Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung. “What is rational 
real and what is real is rational.”
8. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (1963).
9. Hilary Putman, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press., 1981, pp. 150-1)
10. Friedich Nietzche, Froehliche Wissenschaft, Der Tolle Mensch, 125. Karl 
Schlechta, ed., Muenchen: Carl Hanser, 1960)
11. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Guenther Neske, 1961),  Vol. 
2, pp. 31 ff.
12. Seen und Zest, 44a
13. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Einleitung; Heidegger, Kant 
und das Problem der Metaphysik, ( 1929); and Nietzsche (1961), vol. II.
14. Seen und Zest, 44b
15. In Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Heidegger clearly wrote: “Das Wesen der 
Wahrheit ist die Freiheit.”
16. Cf. Karl Rahner, Geist in Welt 
17. See Jacques Derrida, Writings on Religion ( 1992); See also Robert 
Magliola, Derrida on the Mend (1985). Similar idea has been found also in 
Paul Ricoeur, Soi-meme comme un autre, Paris: du Seuil, 1990, chapter on 
“Ipseite et 1”alterite, pp. 367 ff.
18. Similar interpretation has been found in the works of  Heidegger's 
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pupils. See Karl Rahner, Geist in Welt, op. cit., Raymondo Panikka, 
Hinduismus und Christentum, and John Caputo, Heidegger and Thomas 
Aquinas, just to mention a few of  them.
19. North Alfred Whitehead, Religion in The Making (London: Macmillan, 
1926); (Cleveland: The Word Publishing Co., 1960, p.15.
20. See Waldemar Molinski, “Truth” in Sacramentum Mundi, Ed. Karl 
Rahner ( New York: Herder, 197 0), Vol.6, pp. 308-318.
21. Clement of  Alexandria, for example, taught that God is the norm for 
the truth of  beings (Protrepticus, VI,PG VIII, col.173).
22. Molinski, p. 308.
23. According to Molinski, op.cit., p.309, “Boethius refers truth to 
judgment, while St. Anselm of  Canterbury analyses the relation of  
logical truth to ontological truth. Logical truth is an effect of  the summa 
veritas, mediated by created things (De Veritate, chap.19). This means 
that the ontological connection is under the rule of  truth as the 
rectitutido sola mente perceptibilis (chap.11).”
24. Cf. Contra Gentiles, I, 59; De Veritate I,2.
25. Molinski, op.cit., p.310: “ God is the Transcendental Truth means that 
being as an intrinsic relation to spirit and hence to the spirit-soul, and 
also that spirit is ordained to being (De Veritate I, 1). St. Thomas 
combines the Aristotelian notion that the soul is “all things in a certain 
fashion” with the notion of  the truth of  things (Aristotle, The Soul,  
431: Metaphysics, 993 b)
26. Molinski, p.311.
27. Cf. Max Mueller, “Freedom”, in Sacramentum Mundi, Vol.1, pp.352-361; 
see also Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty ( Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), p 122. ff: “The Notion of  ”negative” Freedom”.
28. John Stuart Mill, Essay on Liberty. Quoted by I. Berlin, op.cit., p. 127.
29. Actually, the idea of  positive freedom has been a mark of  the Greek 
culture. The Greek refer to the idea of  self-possession, being 
completely present to oneself, total self-sufficiency as Autarky, while 
the Romans understand  liberty as dominant in actu suos, dominium super se 
ipsum.” Max Mueller, op.cit., p.353.
30. Mueller, p.354.
31. Mueller, p. 353.
32. Whitehead, p. 14. “ But as between religion and arithmetic, other things 
are not equal. You use arithmetic, but you are religious. Arithmetic of  
course enters into your nature, so far as that nature involves a 
multiplicity of  things. But it is there as necessary condition, and not as a 
transforming agency.”
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